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In the wake of the crash of EgyptAir 990 and (at the time of this writing) the possibility that someone in
the cockpit might have intentionally caused the crash, some journalistic sources have bemoaned the
absence of periodic, formal psychological screening by many commercial airlines of all pilots and other
members of a flight crew. For example, it is extremely rare that a comprehensive battery of objective
and projective psychological testing would be used as part of an annual medical screening required of all
pilots at an airline. However, at least two types of psychological screening do occur.
First, a competent physician carrying out a medical evaluation will be sensitive to cues-e.g., physical
appearance, medical history, social history, small talk, and the like-that suggest psychological and social
problems might be beyond what is normal or normative for a specific population. At that time, the
physician may probe more deeply or-if necessary-make a referral to a mental health professional-usually
a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist.
Second, and, perhaps, most importantly, psychological screening occurs on a daily, almost continuous
basis. This screening comprises the interactions between supervisors and supervisees, among
colleagues, among all of these and other friends and family members and so on. The screening becomes
apparent through rumor and innuendo, stories that reflect favorably on an individual, and after-action
reports following an air disaster may often suggest that a number of people "knew" that an individual
"had a problem." Certainly-as with a medical or formal psychological evaluation--some of this
information is accurate, some not, some may be of unknown quality.
At Issue is how the information from both types of screening is used. In both cases, there is often a
resistance to identify and use information that might hurt an individual's career, damage one's
reputation, or cast dispersion on one's own loyalty to the individual. That is why along with adequate
screening procedures must come the nurturing of an organizational culture that maximizes the benign
identification and use of such information.
Unfortunately, in air disasters and other tragedies, the pressure to seize on a "smoking gun" pointing at
a dereliction of duty or responsibility can hide the good in safety/security procedures as well as the bad.
(See Jehl, D. (November 17, 1999). Men on cockpit had solid experience. The New York Times, p. A21;
Martinussen, M., & Torjussen, T. (1997). Pilot selection in the Norwegian Air Force: A validation and
meta-analysis of the test battery. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 8, 33-45; Okaue, M.
(1995). Relations between flight screening test and psychological interview. Reports of Aeromedical
Laboratory, 36, 59-69; Popper, S.E., Morris, C.E., & Briggs, J. (1997). Human subject screening: A dynamic
process. Aviation, Space, & Environmental Medicine, 68, 99-942; Stuck, A.E., et al. (1992).
Multidimensional risk assessment versus age as criterion for retirement of airline pilots. Journal of the
American Geriatrics Society, 40, 526-532; Zuckerman, L. (November 17, 1999). Some crashes classified
as deliberate. The New York Times, p. A21.) (Keywords: Aviation Safety, Psychological Screening.)
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